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The European Union (EU) has developed a strategy to mitigate
climate change by cutting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions while
fostering low carbon technologies with an intermediate target in
2030. The adoption of this complex policy framework has been signed
ofﬁcially in October 2014 under the EU document “The Climate and
Energy Policy Framework”, brieﬂy addressed as EU2030. Although the
Conference of the Parties held in Paris in December 2015 (COP21)
achieved progress towards a global climate mitigation policy with
stringent abatement targets for large emitters, strong scepticisms
remain in the EU debate concerning potential risks of too challenging
unilateral targets adopted by the EU. In fact, even though members of
theUnitedNation FrameworkConvention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
have reached the Paris Agreement to limit global warming below at
least 2 °C, the agreement is based on a voluntary approachwith absence
of sanctions, and requires that 55 countries accounting for at least 55% of
global emissions ratify it. In any case, this global agreement will enter
into force only in 2020 but international leaders have also agreed to
set more ambitious targets every 5 years, in order to ensure a dynami-
cally effective long-term abatement strategy and to reach the globaloma TreUniversity, Rome, Italy.
tantini).emissions peak early and a rapid reduction after that. This primary
aim to reach the global peak of GHG as soon as possible is still based
on the common but differentiated responsibilities principle, meaning
that developing countries are allowed to reach it later than developed
regions. The EU has already presented the intended Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) in line with the EU2030 strategy,
but some doubts still remain, mainly because until a binding global
agreement is in place, the unilateral imposition of mitigation policies
may produce two types of distortive effects. First, if there are countries
not involved in active mitigation, a carbon leakage effect might arise,
in terms of displacement and re-allocation of carbon intensive produc-
tion processes to unregulated countries where no climate policies are
in force. Second, if the EU abatement targets are unilaterally settled as
higher than the other countries' targets, the most vulnerable EU
manufacturing sectors might face severe losses in economic competi-
tiveness due to higher abatement costs.
Several empirical analyses have already addressed these two issues,
without concluding unanimously in the direction of the existence or not
of carbon leakage and competitiveness losses.
There are studies that have not revealed any evidence of carbon
leakage and loss of competitiveness in the energy-intensive sectors
considered at risk of carbon leakage such as cement, aluminium, and
iron and steel (Reinaud, 2008; Ellerman et al., 2010; Okereke and
McDaniels, 2012; Quirion, 2011; Sartor, 2012). A number of reasons
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time period that makes robust empirical estimation difﬁcult, the fact
that ﬁrms are often compensated through policy packages (including
free allocation of allowances), the relatively low price of carbon
allowances over most of the period that the EU Emission Trading
Scheme (EU-ETS) has been in force.
In contrast, there are recent analyses that reveal potential
negative effects related to unilateral EU climate mitigation policies
in a long term scenario approach. More importantly, such studies
propose a wider range of evaluation criteria with the purpose
of selecting the proper policy instruments relying on a multidimen-
sional assessment exercise. Economists have tended to focus on
the criteria of economic efﬁciency and its close relative, cost-
effectiveness (Goulder and Parry, 2008). However, there are other
important criteria for policy-makers, such as the distribution of ben-
eﬁts and costs, the ability to address uncertainties, and elements of
political and administrative feasibility (e.g., Konidari and Mavrakis,
2007). Böhringer et al. (2012) evaluated anti-leakage instruments
according to the criteria of efﬁciency and international equity.
Görlach (2013) developed an ‘optimality’ framework that assesses
policy instruments on the basis of environmental effectiveness, dynamic
efﬁciency, and legal and political feasibility.
The policy instruments currently debated to avoid carbon leakage
and reduce competitiveness losses might be classiﬁed twofold.
First, there are some already adopted (and legally feasible) solutions
applied domestically, that consist in the free allocation of CO2 emission
allowances to sectors in danger of carbon leakage (EC, 2014a) and the
temporary compensation for increased electricity prices (EC, 2012).
While these policy instruments are deemed to be environmentally
effective because of the announced future decrease of the total volume
of allowances, there is doubt over their dynamic efﬁciency. In particular,
while the benchmarking rules provide some incentive for innovation,
there is limited evidence that the current policy instruments have
stimulated innovation in the past and that they will provide a
continuous incentive to innovation in the future in order to ensure
dynamic efﬁciency.
Second, there are several proposals about protecting domestic
industries from foreign competitiveness by adopting Border Carbon
Adjustments (BCA). BCA are characterized in the EU-ETS Directive's
preamble as an “effective carbon equalization system” (EC, 2009,
par. 25) and deﬁned in Art 10b as “the inclusion in the Community
scheme of importers of products which are produced by the sectors
or subsectors determined in accordance with Article 10a”.1 BCA are
commonly regarded as effective in the literature (Böhringer et al.,
2012), nonetheless they are not free of limitations. Among the
main criticisms, BCA are subject to the risk of shifting the cost of
emission abatement from developed to developing countries
through trade mechanisms, and the fact that BCA might be used as
“green protectionism” and thus jeopardise abating efforts in emerg-
ing countries (Babiker and Rutherford, 2005; Evenett and Whalley,
2009; Holmes et al., 2011). Moreover, many observers do not regard
border measures as a constructive means of incentivising third
countries to engage in climate friendly business; on the contrary,
“border measures are likely to trigger retaliatory measures by
trading partners” (Eurofer, 2014, p. 58). The BCA policy design also
requires determining which goods and sectors to include and how
to calculate the amount of CO2 associated with exports of speciﬁc
goods: this complexity and the high cost of implementation explain
why BCA are almost never adopted (Condon and Ignaciuk, 2013).
Therefore, the dynamic efﬁciency of the BCA instrument is uncertain
and depends on its exact design, particularly with respect to the
determination of the carbon embodied in products, based on an
average, predominant or best available technology (Bednar-Friedl1 The sectors and subsectors determined in accordance with Article 10a are those that
are at risk of carbon leakage.et al., 2012). Its legal feasibility, especially with the international
trade law of the World Trade Organization (WTO), needs further
investigation and its political feasibility is ambiguous.
An alternative policy instrument that has not yet been adopted
but that it seems highly valuable is the direct support for European
industrial innovation with the help of revenues from the sale of
emissions allowances (Neuhoff et al., 2014; Nunez and Katarivas,
2014). The policy instrument could be effective in the sense that it
could prevent ‘innovation investment leakage’, i.e. preventing
internationally operating companies from shifting research and
development (RD) investments and market launch abroad. From a
dynamic efﬁciency perspective, the approach would encourage the
industrial sector's successful transition to low carbon production,
reduce costs to meet long term objectives and create technological
advantage (EC, 2014b). In terms of legal feasibility, EU state aid
rules need to be adjusted. Subsidies for innovation should not be a
distortion of internal EU competition.
In this paper, we are mainly interested in evaluating the potential
gains associated to this last alternative policy solution, that to the
best of our knowledge has not yet been assessed and compared to
the other two well-established policy solutions. In order to follow
the recent evaluation exercises developed by the international
literature, we apply the ‘optimality’ framework by Görlach (2013)
and quantify a number of indicators of environmental effectiveness,
(dynamic) efﬁciency and political feasibility with the help of ex-ante
simulations of the effects of anti-leakage policy instruments on
global emissions and international trade and competitiveness
over the period 2010–2050 by using a dynamic Computable General
Equilibrium Model (CGE) based on the GTAP framework dealing
with climate and energy issues.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
the economic modelling literature on anti-leakage policy instru-
ments. Section 3 presents our dynamic CGE model, main assump-
tions and data and describes the baseline and the policy scenarios.
Section 4 reports the simulation results. Section 5 presents our as-
sessment of the anti-leakage policy options in terms of ‘optimality’
criteria and Section 6 concludes.2. Review of Literature
The economic impact of energy and mitigation policies can be
analysed using different appliedmodels that can assess how the econo-
my will react to any exogenous shock, such as the imposition or cut of
tariff on imports, export subsidies, trade liberalization and the impact
of price rises for a particular good or changes in supply for strategic
resources such as fossil fuels. There are numerous examples of simula-
tions of economic scenarios through bottom-up, top-down or integrat-
ed assessment models. In particular, dynamic computable general
equilibrium (CGE) models are analytical representations of the inter-
connected exchanges that take place between all economic agents in
the modelled economy based on observed data. The advantages of this
kind of analysis are given by the fact that they can evaluate direct as
well as indirect costs, spillover effects and economic trade-offs in a
multi-region perspective.
The assessment of the potential impacts of climate change policy and
mitigation measures is an essential input to policy decisions regarding
the climate system (Burton et al., 2002). In the perspective of providing
a comprehensive analysis of alternative policies, several global models
combining economic and social data with climate and technology
information have been developed. In general, these models try to
deal with the high level of uncertainty in the costs of mitigation
policies, generally over a long time horizon. They help select
alternative scenarios of climate policies by considering different
policy measures and interventions in a global dimension or across
regions and economic sectors.
2 A similar argument applies to the revenues from the auction of tradable permits.
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change. However, if abatement efforts are played unilaterally,
there is the risk of generating distortive effects among particularly
vulnerable economic sectors or across regions. Energy intensive
sectors are vulnerable to increases in energy prices and, consequent-
ly, climate change policies that affect energy prices may generate
deeper negative impacts on energy intensive sectors than on less
energy intensive sectors. This could also lead to variations in terms
of comparative advantages, especially for energy intensive and
trade exposed (EITE) sectors. Indeed, in an interconnected global
market, carbon leakage may occur according to which a unilateral
policy may result in a shift in the production location with an in-
crease of carbon intensive production in non-regulated countries,
partially annulling the GHG reduction achieved in abating countries
(Copeland and Taylor, 2004).
A small but rapidly expanding literature has analysed policy
instruments to mitigate carbon leakage and adverse impacts on com-
petitiveness. Several potential ‘anti-leakage’measures have been identi-
ﬁed, including international sectoral agreements, cost containment
measures, free or output-based allocation of allowances, and border
adjustment measures (Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006; Houser et al., 2008;
Kuik and Hofkes, 2010).
Branger and Quirion (2014) carry out a meta-analysis of recent BCA
studies. They collect 25 studies from the period 2004–2012, providing
310 estimates of carbon leakage. They ﬁnd that the mean rate of carbon
leakage without BCA is 14% (5%–25%) and 6% (−5%–15%) with BCA.
Holding all other parameters constant, BCA reduces carbon leakage by
6% points. In the meta-analysis, the effectiveness of BCA is most
sensitive to the inclusion of all manufacturing sectors (instead of only
EITE sectors) and export rebates. Remarkably, the meta-analysis
suggests that the effectiveness is less sensitive to whether the BCA are
based on domestic or foreign CO2-intensities.
Fischer and Fox (2012) compare three variants of BCA (a charge on
import, rebate for exports, and full border adjustment) and output-
based allocation. They simulate a USD 50 carbon tax in the US, Canada,
and Europe, respectively. They conclude that full BCA, especially when
it is based on foreign carbon intensities, would be the most effective
policy for avoiding leakage, although the ability of anti-leakage
measures to enhance global emissions depends on sector and country
characteristics. They further argue that when BCAwould not be feasible
because of legal (WTO) or practical considerations, output-based alloca-
tion could in most circumstances achieve the bulk of the gains in terms
of mitigating carbon leakage.
Böhringer et al. (2012) adopt a CGE model to compare three policy
instruments used to mitigate adverse effects on competitiveness and
leakage: BCA, output-based allocation, and exemptions for EITE
industries. They compare these instruments for different coalitions
of abating countries and different abatement targets. They show
that the rate of carbon leakage increases with the abatement target
and decreases with the size of the abatement coalition. In the
smallest coalition, EU27 plus EFTA countries, the rate of leakage
varies between 15% and 21% at abatement rates of 10% to 30% of
the benchmark emission levels of the coalition countries. Full BCAs
that level the playing ﬁeld between domestic and foreign producers
of EITE goods are most effective in decreasing carbon leakage: they
decrease leakage by more than a third. In their simulations output-
based allocation and exemptions are less effective because they do
not offset the comparative disadvantage of EITE industries as much
as the BCAs, partly because they do not compensate for increased
electricity costs.
In contrast to output-based allocation and exemptions, BCA shifts a
large part of the carbon abatement burden to non-coalition countries.
BCAs therefore “fare poorly when our welfare measures account for
even amodest degree of inequality-aversion and there is nomechanism
in place to compensate losers under the border-tax-adjustment regime”
(Böhringer et al., 2012, p.209).The assessment of the size of carbon leakage and the effectiveness of
anti-leakagemeasures is affected bymanymodel characteristics and as-
sumptions, including the type of economicmodel (Branger and Quirion,
2014), sectoral aggregation (Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012; Caron, 2012),
inclusion of process emissions (Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012), assumptions
on the supply of fossil energy (Sinn, 2008), endogenous technological
change and diffusion (Gerlagh and Kuik, 2014), elasticity parameters
(Antimiani et al., 2013) and the underlying theory of international
trade (Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012).
For the long term perspective, there are a number of assessments
of possible solutions to reach the deﬁned GHG targets and the
induced economic effects. Hübler and Löschel (2013) analyse the
EU roadmap to 2050 in a CGE framework considering alternative
unilateral and global policy scenarios, with andwithout the inclusion
of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and equalization of
permits price across sectors (ETS and non-ETS) and world regions.
They conclude that RD investments and new technology options
are of crucial importance. In this respect, we need to recall that
other than the ETS, there are different types of environmental poli-
cies and measures in place or at least discussed by the literature.
Market-based instruments may take also the form of taxes or subsi-
dies, typically designed with the aim to achieve abatement targets
and incentive innovation, ensuring efﬁciency and cost-effectiveness
(Fullerton et al., 2010). Environmental taxes are relatively easy to
enforce and may provide worthy solutions with respect to resource
allocation, but if unilaterally applied may also induce trade distor-
tion and affect international distribution and competitiveness.
Concerning environmental subsidies, while they may produce the
same effect in term of emissions price, they could also induce an in-
crease in the level of output (contrary to taxes that increase the
ﬁrms' costs) and, perhaps, also of emissions. On the other hand,
command-and-control measures and direct regulation, as the intro-
duction of quotas and standards, are alternative policy options that,
if properly designed and beside their high enforcement costs, can
guarantee the prescribed abatement with a low level of uncertainty,
but not at the least cost (Oates and Baumol, 1975).
Although all the aforementioned measures ultimately aim at the
achievement of the same goal of reducing GHG emissions, and given
the existence of market failures, externalities and additional environ-
mental goals next to emissions abatement, combining (partly) overlap-
ping measures could be justiﬁed. According to Oates and Baumol
(1975), there are several examples of complex environmental problems
that should be better solved by adopting an “optimal policy package”
that combines different instruments, including direct controls and
voluntary initiatives.
To this purpose, Christiansen and Smith (2012) analyse the
effect of a combined use of environmental taxes and direct regula-
tion in term of suitability to control externalities. They show that,
while in some cases the use of taxation alone should be preferred,
different types of distortions can be reduced with the introduction
of further regulatory measures. They also explicitly abstract from
the additional contribution of taxes in term of potential government
revenue, which relates to the well-known “double-dividend” issue
(Goulder, 1995; Bosquet, 2000; Patuelli et al., 2002; Fernández
et al., 2011).2 Moreover, combining the use of taxes with direct
regulation, but also with subsidies for investment in abatement
technology, helps reducing the uncertainty about abatement costs
(Christiansen and Smith, 2015).
Hence, a combination of policies to mitigate concentration of
GHG emissions and, at the same time, promote RD activities, support
technology or improve energy security may be appropriate (Fischer
and Newell, 2008; Goulder, 2013). For example, Fischer and Newell
(2008) conclude that an optimal portfolio of climate measures
3 In Fig. 1, the carbon tax level and the parameters in the white boxes are exogenously
determined. See also Appendix I for further details on the model speciﬁcation.
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tax, green quota and subsidies for renewables energy production
and RD) may allow the abatement targets to be reached at lower
costs than any single policy alone would imply. Furthermore, in the
presence of market distortions, “[i]f differential emission pricing
or/and overlapping regulation can sufﬁciently ameliorate initial
distortions then the direct excess costs from a ﬁrst-best perspective
can be more than offset through indirect efﬁciency gains on initial
distortions” (Böhringer et al., 2009, p. 304).
Indeed, the debate over the optimal policy mix and the possible con-
sequences that overlapping regulation may have, in terms of adverse ef-
fects on efﬁciency and effectiveness, is rich and complex. It can be
optimal with regard to economic theory, abatement costs or economic
competitiveness, but conclusions derived from applied models should
also consider the (partial or general equilibrium) scale dimension.
Taking the EU targets as given, the optimality is strictly linked to cost-
effectiveness, but at the same time is a broader concept that has to ac-
count for a high level of uncertainty (technological, organizational, social)
in a dynamic perspective. Görlach (2013) tries to answer the questions of
what ‘optimal’ in this casemeans and summarizes three criteria to assess
the performance of policies: environmental effectiveness, cost effective-
ness and practical feasibility. The optimal solution would be able to
induce the required emission reduction, at the least cost (with respect
to the overall time horizon, thus ensuring static and dynamic efﬁciency),
accounting for the risks of the policy not being implemented as designed
and the selected tools not being able to deliver the awaited results
(political, legal and administrative feasibility).
Moreover, in the complexity of the policy mix, when reasoning over
the coherence between objectives and instruments, it should also be
noted which regulation covers certain economic activities (and which
not), the potential feedbacks among them, and how well a measure
works in practice, especially the EU-ETS. For this purpose, the public
choice approach adopted by Gawel et al. (2014) emphasizes that if the
EU-ETS is scrutinized under real conditions of market failures, its cost
and environmental effectiveness is weaker than expected in economic
theory. Accordingly, a complimentary policy measure, as a support to
renewable energies, may contribute to improving the efﬁciency of the
EU climate strategy.
Finally, further questions concern the optimality of the policymix in
a dynamic rather than a static context and investigation into whether
signiﬁcant differences exist, depending on the timing of the introduc-
tion of mitigation measures and the phases of technological innovation
and diffusion (Costantini et al., 2014).
3. Methodology
3.1. Model Details for Assessing the Impacts of EU Climate Policy
The recursive-dynamic version (GDynE) of the GTAP-E (Global Trade
Analysis Project— Energy)model, as described inGolub (2013), builds on
the comparatively-static energy version of the GTAP-E (Burniaux and
Truong, 2002; McDougall and Golub, 2007) in combination with the dy-
namic GDyn model (Ianchovichina and McDougall, 2000). The GDynE
model adopted here uses the GTAP-Database 8.1, together with the addi-
tional GTAP-Energy data on CO2 emissions. With respect to the model
version available from the GTAP ofﬁcial website, the GDynE model
adopted for this paper contains two policy options modelled for the
evaluation of the EU climate policy mix, a carbon border tax and the
investments in RD for energy efﬁciency and renewable energy.
The ﬁrst one introduces a BCA according to the modelling
approach developed by Antimiani et al. (2013) for a static setting,
where equations are expressed in log linear form in order to repre-
sent the effects in terms of percentage change. The lower-case letters
refer to derivatives whereas upper-case letters refer to variables in
level. The equation representing the inﬂuence of a BCA on the ﬁnal
good domestic demand is settled in order to impose a BCA only ongoods imported by EU from the rest of the world that are not already
subject to carbon taxation (thus excluding energy commodities).
Accordingly, while changes in the demand for the domestic product
(y) can be synthesized as function of price elasticity (ηY b 0) and
price changes (pY) as:
y ¼ ηYpY ð1Þ
changes in the level of the ﬁnal demand for the imported good are
formally expressed as follows:
y1 ¼ ηY pY þ τY1ð Þ ð2Þ
where y1 is the changes in the demand for the imported good, which
corresponds to the same good produced domestically (Y), whose de-
mand elasticity and price are represented by ηY and pY. The BCA (τY1)
is applied as an ad valorem equivalent only to that portion of good Y
imported from outside EU (y1). The ad valorem equivalent of the BCA
is generally deﬁned as a function of the market price of the good (pY),
the speciﬁc carbon tax or carbon allowance price (CTAX) imposed to
the emitters in the form of an excise and the carbon content of the
taxed sector (CCY), given by the ratio of CO2 emissions to value added:
τY1 ¼ f pYCTAX;CCYð Þ ð3Þ
with
∂τY1
∂pY
b 0;
∂τY1
∂CTAX
N 0;
∂τY1
∂CCY
N 0 ð4Þ
Depending on which carbon content is adopted (based on a Best
Available Technology (BAT) in Europe or on the real carbon intensity
of the exporting country), the ad valorem equivalent changes according
to the speciﬁc value assumed.
The second policy option introduces a mechanism to directly
ﬁnance RD in energy efﬁciency and renewable sources in the
electricity sector, according to Markandya et al. (2015). We assume
that part of the revenue from carbon taxation (CTR) or the revenue
from the sale of allowances directly ﬁnances RD activities aiming
to promote improvements in energy efﬁciency, in an input-
augmenting technical change manner, and increases the installed
capacity of renewable energy. In this second case, investment efforts
must be interpreted as output-augmenting technical change. In the
standard version of the model, the revenue from carbon taxation is
considered as a source of public budget that directly contributes to do-
mestic welfare and it is usually modelled as a lump sum contributing to
the welfare of the regional household.
The share to be taken from the CTR (γ in Fig. 1) collected through
a carbon tax or an emissions trading scheme, that is directed towards
RD activities is exogenously given, meaning that it is independent
from the total amount of CTR gathered.3 It should be noted that in
this work, the x% of CTR is not uniformly applied to all regions
because this mechanism is only active for the EU, whereas in all
other regions the share is zero.
Obviously, while the x% is exogenous, the total amount of CTR
directed to RD activities (CTRD) is endogenously determined by the
emission abatement target and the carbon tax level. This means
that, when RD activities are transformed into efﬁciency gains or
into an increase in renewable energy, the ﬁnal effects on the
economic system will inﬂuence the carbon tax level (for a given
abatement target) and, consequently, the CTRD total amount. The
amount of CTRD used for ﬁnancing RD activities and contributing
to domestic welfare must be detracted from the Equivalent Variation
(EV) measure. Having introduced the RD ﬁnancing mechanism only
Fig. 1.Model representation of the RD ﬁnancing mechanism.
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respect to the functioning of the CTRD.
The total amount of CTRD can be used for improving technical
change in energy efﬁciency and in renewable energies. The choice of
the share of total CTRD to be directed towards energy efﬁciency or
renewables is exogenously given (δ in Fig. 1), as part of the EU policy
options for the climate strategy. The current distribution of total
public budget in EU for RD activities in EE and RW (IEA database) is
that on average over ten years (2003–2012) 60% was directed
towards energy efﬁciency and 40% towards renewable energies.
The relationship between technical change and RD expenditures
is modelled according to two elasticity parameters in order to trans-
form RD efforts (mln USD) into technical progress in energy efﬁcien-
cy and renewable energy. In this paper, we assume that all RD efforts
directed towards improvements in energy efﬁciency in the produc-
tion function are not affected by technical barriers. The elasticity pa-
rameter for energy efﬁciency (rEE) has been calibrated according to
latest reports by ENERDATA (2014) considering the sectoral efﬁcien-
cy gain and the public RD investment in energy efﬁciency during the
aforementioned decade, as an average value between industry,
residential sector and transport. In the case of renewable energy,
we introduce an improving technical change measure in the electric-
ity sector, according to a reactivity parameter (rRW) that is calibrated
with regard to the same ten years of investment in RD activities in
renewable energies and the corresponding increase in installed
capacity in renewable electricity in EU countries.43.2. Baseline and Policy Scenarios
We employ a time horizon to 2050 in order to perform a long term
analysis of climate change policies in a world-integrated framework. As
a standard modelling choice, we work with 5-year periods.
As far as country and sector coverage is concerned, we consider 20
regions and 20 sectors. With respect to the former, we distinguish
between developed (Canada, European Union, Former Soviet Union,
Japan, Korea, Norway, United States, Rest of OECD) and developing
countries (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, African Energy Ex-
porters, American Energy Exporters, Asian Energy Exporters, Rest of
Africa, Rest of America, Rest of Asia and Rest of Europe).
Considering the sectoral aggregation, we identify 20 industries
with special attention paid to the manufacturing industry (Food,
beverages and tobacco; Textile; Wood; Pulp and paper; Chemical and4 Because it was beyond the scope of the present work to deal with uncertainty and
risks in innovation ﬁnancing, we follow very conservative assumptions in this regard. In
other words, we assume that the response in term of technical change, in both EE and
RW domains, due to an increase in the public RD investment, is the same as those regis-
tered in the last decade. Further development should incorporate at least some of the crit-
ical issues at stake in this regard. Fewexamples are the amount of investment neededwith
respect to the abatement potential, the timing of the abatement, the differences in term of
resource needed, impact on competitiveness (and economic performance) or the uncer-
tainty in the future costs of climate change with respect to damages, technological costs
and ﬁnancial constraints.petrochemical; Non-metallic Minerals; Basic metals; Machinery equip-
ment; Transport equipment and Other manufacturing industries).
Moreover, in addition to Agriculture, Transport (also distinguishing
Water and Air transport) and Services, energy commodities were
also disaggregated in Coal, Oil, Gas, Oil products and Electricity.
The projections for macro variables such as GDP, population and la-
bour force are given by the combination of several sources. Projections
for exogenous variables are taken as given bymajor international organi-
zations. GDP projections are taken from the comparison of the reference
case for four main sources, the OECD Long Run Economic Outlook, the
GTAPMacro projections, the IIASA projections used for the OECD EnvLink
model and the CEPII macroeconomic projections used in the GINFORS
model. Population projections are taken from theUNStatistics (UNDESA).
Projections for the labour force (modelled here as skilled and unskilled)
are taken by comparing labour force projections provided by the ILO
(for aggregate labour) with those provided by the GTAP Macro projec-
tions (where skilled and unskilled labour forces are disentangled).
With respect to the calibration of CO2 emissions, in the reference sce-
nario, the model presents emissions by 2050 in accordance with the CO2
projection givenby International EnergyAgency in theWorld EnergyOut-
look 2013 and Energy Information Administration (EIA). In order to have
calibrated emissions in accordance with a speciﬁc EU perspective, emis-
sions provided by IAM climate models such as GCAM in a ‘Do-nothing’
scenario for EU countries are also compared with GDynE output.5
When considering the climate policy options, these are all based on a
CO2 pathway that respects the 450PPM scenario developed by IEA (and
RCP 2.6 by IPCC).
The policy options here described (Fig. 2) have been selected accord-
ing to the criterion of minimizing the number of simulations, in order to
picture a range of results able to provide sufﬁcient information for the
purpose of the current analysis. The two standard market-based policy
options considered refer to a domestic carbon tax, where every country
reduces its own emissions internally, and to an international emissions
trading system that allows all countries to trade emissions until an
equilibrium price is reached. In order to simplify the analysis, by
modelling EU as an aggregate, the two market-based policy options
(carbon taxation and emission trading) are equivalent when an
emissions target is imposed only in the EU in the case of unilateral
climate policy. Indeed, the carbon tax in the whole EU corresponds to
the minimum cost for achieving the target that is equivalent to the
permit price level if EU countries are singled out and the whole econo-
my is involved in ETS. As a benchmark, we also provide results from a
scenario where every region in the world has an abatement target and
implements a domestic mitigation policy in the form of a carbon tax.6
The third policy option includes a BCA based on the carbon content
of traded goods, only accounting for the direct emissions, therefore5 The ‘Do-nothing’ scenario is coherent with IEA Current Policies and the RCP 6.0 from
IPCC scenarios.
6 In all scenarioswhere the emissions target is given to the EU only, emissions levels for
all the other countries are endogenously given by themodel in order to verify to what ex-
tent a unilateral climate policy may induce a carbon leakage effect.
Table 1
CO2 emissions for EU27 (MTons).
Scenarios 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
BAU 3517 3314 3197 3117 3015 2946 2862 2835
GCTAX 3343 2967 2466 1996 1637 1358 1119 940
GET 3413 3131 2795 2439 2050 1705 1384 1139
EU-ETS 3343 2967 2466 1996 1637 1358 1119 940
BCAbat 3343 2967 2466 1996 1637 1358 1119 940
BCAnobat 3343 2967 2466 1996 1637 1358 1119 940
EERW 3343 2967 2466 1996 1637 1358 1119 940
Source: our elaboration on GDynE results.
Fig. 2. GDynE baseline and policy scenarios.
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all intermediates. In order to quantify the embedded carbon from non-
abating country production, we consider two alternative approaches,
based on the importer or exporter carbon content of traded commodi-
ties. In the ﬁrst case, we apply a BAT approach in the importing country,
and the carbon content for each good producedwithin the EU is applied
to imported goods coming from non-abating economies. The second
one considers the effective carbon content of the imported goods, thus
relying on the production technique applied by the producing country.
This second method could introduce a high degree of uncertainty for
exporting countries and lead to a heterogeneous treatment and a
relative penalty for less developed economies.
We then consider an increase in energy efﬁciency and in the
share of renewable energies in the energy mix. In the former
case, we consider the target declared by the EU2030 strategy
that refers to an improvement in energy efﬁciency of 27% in 2030
with respect to a current policy scenario. With respect to the
latter, and considering the speciﬁc GDynE model features, we
only modelled a part of the EU2030 strategy, namely the 40%
share of electricity produced by renewable sources by 2030 (EC,
2014b), without considering other renewables used in other
sectors. The model setting is chosen in order to respect the 2030
target, while continuing to be effective up to the ﬁnal 2050 time
horizon. As a result, the increasing levels of abatement targets re-
quired to respect the 450PPM concentration target for the EU CO2
emissions trajectory would produce increasing values for carbon
tax revenue and increasing amount of RD investments in energy
efﬁciency and renewable energy.
Summing up, scenarios included in the analysis are:
1. the baseline up to 2050 (BAU);
2. the 450PPM target where all countries globally achieve the
emissions level by applying country-speciﬁc domestic carbon
taxes (GCTAX);
3. the 450PPM targetwhere all countries achieve the emissions level by
participating in a global emissions trading system (GET);
4. the 450PPM target where only the EU reduces emissions with a
domestic market-based policy based on ETS (EU-ETS);
5. the 450PPM target where only the EU reduces emissions with
a domestic market-based policy based on ETS and a carbon
tariff proportional to carbon tax based on a BAT approach
(BCAbat);6. the 450PPM target where only the EU reduces emissions with a do-
mestic market-based policy based on ETS and a carbon tariff propor-
tional to carbon tax based on the carbon content of the imported
good (BCAnobat); and
7. the 450PPM target where only the EU reduces emissions with a do-
mestic market-based policy based on ETS combined with the in-
crease of energy efﬁciency and the production of electricity with
renewable sources ﬁnanced through a 10% levy on carbon tax reve-
nue, calibrated in order to comply with by 2030 the EU2030 target
of 27% in energy efﬁciency and 40% in renewable electricity (EERW).
4. Results
TheCO2 emissions pathways in the seven scenarios here adopted are
described in Table 1. First, the emissions levels in all scenarios where
only the EU adopts a climate strategy up to 2050 are equalized, since
the core of this study is to assess the cost of alternative policy solutions
that aim to reach the same climate target. As a benchmark, it is worth
mentioning that the EU emissions level in the GCTAX scenario, where
all countries at the global level respect a target by implementing a do-
mestic carbon tax policy, is exactly the same as in the unilateral EU cli-
mate policy cases, since the EU2030 and 2050 climate targets settled by
the EuropeanCommission coincidewith an emissions trend that is com-
patible with a 450PPM scenario.
The unit cost for abating one ton of CO2 in each period of the simu-
lation exercise is reported for the six alternative policy scenarios in
Table 2. If all countries implement domestic policies in order to be on
track with a 450PPM pathway (GCTAX), the cost in terms of carbon
tax is extremely high for all countries. For the EU, this carbon tax level
is increasing over time as targets become more binding, and will reach
Table 2
Carbon tax level for EU27 (USD per ton of CO2).
Scenarios 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
GCTAX 13 26 103 206 269 340 457 582
GET 7 10 45 106 175 232 345 443
EU-ETS 10 17 71 140 172 208 265 309
BCAbat 10 17 71 140 172 207 265 309
BCAnobat 10 17 72 142 174 210 268 312
EERW 12 22 67 127 160 195 249 289
Source: our elaboration on GDynE results.
Table 4
Energy intensity for EU27 (toe per mln USD).
Scenarios 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
BAU 124.48 104.88 91.81 82.41 74.01 66.98 60.67 56.19
GCTAX 121.43 98.62 77.81 60.44 47.43 37.59 29.76 24.17
GET 122.66 101.73 84.63 69.57 55.57 44.18 34.63 27.82
EU-ETS 121.15 98.63 78.59 62.31 50.14 40.76 33.39 28.28
BCAbat 121.17 98.67 78.67 62.42 50.27 40.90 33.53 28.42
BCAnobat 121.19 98.71 78.76 62.57 50.48 41.19 33.87 28.86
EERW 121.22 98.76 79.04 63.27 51.46 42.23 34.99 29.79
Source: our elaboration on GDynE results.
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the permits' price obtained in the GET scenario (443 USD), where all
countries participate in an international emission trading system, the
fact that a global agreement with permit trading is more cost-effective
is conﬁrmed.
Turning to a unilateral EU climate strategy, it is worth mentioning
that by relying on the EU-ETS, the level of the permits' price by 2050
is about 309 USD per ton. The reduced unitary cost in comparison to
global participation (GCTAX, GET) is fully explained by the dynamic
CGE approach here adopted. When all countries at the global level
must compete for acquiring inputs on the international markets to sub-
stitute fossil fuels, reaching the climate targets becomes increasingly
costly. The increased competition on alternative inputs directly inﬂu-
ences themarginal abatement costs by pushing up prices in the interna-
tional markets for all goods and this explains why after 2030, the
permits' price in GET is increasingly more than the price in EU-ETS.
The effect on permits' price in the case of unilateral EU climate policy
complemented by trade competitiveness protection represented by the
imposition of a BCA designed for ensuring a level playing ﬁeld is almost
negligible, whatever carbon content approach is adopted (BCAbat and
BCAnobat). This means that the introduction of trade protection mea-
sures does not inﬂuence the marginal abatement costs of reaching the
emissions target.
It is also worth mentioning that the carbon leakage rate, calculated
as the ratio between the increase in CO2 emissions by the rest of the
world with respect to the BAU scenario and the emissions reduction
by the EU (EU-ETS) is high and increasing over time, resulting in a
rate of 16% in 2015 up to a rate of 49% in 2050 (Table 3).
When adopting protective measures based on trade protection pol-
icies, the carbon tax level remains stable with a small increase when
the carbon content of the imported goods is adopted as a weighting cri-
terion for the tariff imposed by the EU. More importantly, these trade
protection measures allow the carbon leakage rate to be reduced by
only 1%-point in the case of a BAT approach and by 6%-points by 2050
when the second carbon content option is taken.
In contrast, when the technological change policy is evaluated
(EERW), the leakage rate is increasingly reduced starting from 2030,
reaching −18%-points by 2050 with respect to the EU-ETS scenario.
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that starting from 2025 the mar-
ginal abatement cost for reaching a given target starts to decrease
until reaching a difference with the pure ETS policy of 20 USD per ton
of CO2 by 2050.
As a general remark, it is worth mentioning that by adopting a ﬁxed
10% levy of total carbon tax revenue, the amount of RD required to en-
sure the successful achievement of the three policy goals (reduction inTable 3
Carbon leakage rate (%).
Scenarios 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
EU-ETS 15.68 22.31 28.37 35.30 40.99 45.47 46.73 48.63
BCAbat 15.35 21.91 27.75 34.52 40.10 44.53 45.70 47.59
BCAnobat 13.43 19.30 24.12 30.12 35.16 39.24 40.03 42.26
EERW 18.13 23.98 25.71 28.50 30.48 31.55 30.50 30.25
Source: our elaboration on GDynE results.carbon emissions, improve in energy efﬁciency, and increase in renew-
able energy quota) is augmented by 50% in 2015 compared with the ac-
tual value of RD investments in 2010, thus suggesting that the carbon
tax revenues can indeed boost RD in this direction.
In order to compare results in terms of energy intensity achieve-
ments, the broad energy intensity level, calculated by the dynamic
GDynE model and compatible with the EU2030 target of reaching a
27% increase in energy efﬁciency by 2030 with regard to a BAU case, is
60.16 toe of energy consumption for each million USD of GDP at the
EU level (Table 4).
The energy intensity level obtained by the pure ETS policy
strategy reaches the value of 62.31 toe per mln USD in 2030,
which is higher than the EU2030 target. More importantly, when
complementing the ETS with trade protection measures, the energy
intensity slightly increases in both carbon content approaches. By
imposing a 10% levy on carbon tax revenue in EU to be directed
towards RD ﬂows in energy efﬁciency and renewable energy in the
electricity sector, the carbon price is reduced (hence denoting a
reduction in total abatement costs paid by the EU) but the energy
intensity level (63.27 toe per mln USD) is higher than the expected
target and even higher than the energy intensity achieved in the
EU-ETS scenario. This last result denotes a non-negligible rebound
effect on energy prices, which may be explained by the behaviour
of energy markets in a unilateral climate policy.
The reduction in energy demand by the EU does not inﬂuence
international energy prices. By investing in energy efﬁciency and
renewables, the internal costs for energy consumption (given by the
combination of the international market prices for energy and the
domestic carbon tax) are reduced compared with the EU-ETS policy
option. Given the rigidity of energy demand, this directly leads to an
increase in energy consumption compared with the ETS policy option
alone. This is not necessarily a negative effect since the increase in
energy consumption is fuelled by renewable sources.
The economic gains obtained by fostering green technologies in the
energy sector are here presented in terms of the reduction in GDP losses
with respect to BAU when the EERW scenario is compared with the
other policy mix strategies (Table 5). Hence, EU incentives to RD in
green energy technologies together with a reduction in the carbon tax
level (at least from 2025, although in the previous periods differences
in tax levels are almost negligible), ensure better results in term of
higher GDP for the entire 2015–2050 period with respect to the other
non-global options.Table 5
GDP changes w.r.t. BAU for EU27 (%).
Scenarios 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
GCTAX 0.10 0.36 0.63 0.99 1.80 2.91 4.23 5.81
GET 0.08 0.37 0.95 1.95 3.20 4.35 5.27 6.12
EU-ETS −0.09 −0.27 −0.82 −1.80 −2.89 −3.91 −4.79 −5.52
BCAbat −0.09 −0.27 −0.82 −1.81 −2.91 −3.93 −4.82 −5.54
BCAnobat −0.09 −0.28 −0.82 −1.83 −2.96 −4.02 −4.98 −5.78
EERW −0.08 −0.24 −0.62 −1.29 −2.01 −2.68 −3.27 −3.77
Source: our elaboration on GDynE results.
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tion policy, the EU faces a slight increase in GDP losses in relation
to the ETS case. This clearly reveals that the adoption of carbon tariffs
cannot help to reduce the cost of combatting climate change andmay
increase the heavy burden in abating countries. The small increase in
GDP losses is fully explained by the CGE approach here adopted.
When imposing tariffs on import ﬂows, ﬁrms face an increase in im-
port prices for inputs required for the production process, thus
resulting in a further production cost to be sustained domestically.
This leads to a further deterioration of international competiveness,
especially for manufacturing sectors.
More generally, by comparing scenarios with a unilateral EU climate
policywith scenarios representing a global abatement strategy, theGDP
losses for the EU in the former cases becomeGDP gains in the latter. The
international economic linkages depicted in GDynE reveal that in the
case of a global deal, whatever mitigation measure is adopted, the EU
would achieve substantial economic gains by participating in an inter-
national climate agreement. The abatement costs for achieving climate
targets for the other countries are larger than for the EU, transforming
the climate burden for the EU into an economic growth opportunity.
This result may explain the negotiations deadlock caused by the coun-
tries that will face the major part of the climate burden. However, it
also should encourage the EU to continue to work towards a global
agreement since the unilateral solution is extremely costly and inefﬁ-
cient from an environmental point of view.
This result is also valid when comparing the effects on the export
and output values of the manufacturing sector (Table 6 and Table A1
in Appendix II). Figures obtained for export ﬂows in the manufacturing
sector at the aggregate level are particularly interesting (Table 6). Losses
for EU industries in terms of international competitiveness on the inter-
national markets are high also in the case of a global agreement. If tar-
gets are achieved by implementing an international permits scheme,
these losses appear to be reduced.
If a unilateral EU climate strategy is adopted by implementing anETS
system, export ﬂowswill face a strong reductionwith respect to BAU by
2040. Protective measures based on BCA cannot ensure full protection
for European industries. On the contrary, they may bring further eco-
nomic costs to the industrial sector since export ﬂows decrease at a
slightly higher rate when BCA are implemented in comparison to a
pure ETS solution without BCA. This means that, if complementary pol-
icies rely on trademeasures, a level playing ﬁeld can only be restored by
implementing export subsidies as a form of full adjustment, but such
measures are extremely difﬁcult to get accepted in the multilateral
trade agreement context.
In contrast, when RD efforts inmore efﬁcient technologies and alter-
native energy sources are exploited, export ﬂow losses will start to de-
crease in relation to the other unilateral policy mix strategies by 2035.
In fact, while from 2015 to 2030 the results show tiny differences
among the unilateral EU abatement strategies (except for 2025 and
2030where export losses are larger in the EERWscenario in comparison
to the non-global scenarios), from 2035 sustaining green energy tech-
nologies ensures a continuous reduction in export losses. The fact that
the EERW scenario becomes increasingly convenient in the medium-
long run is due to the fact that investment in RD in sustainable technol-
ogies foster a restructuring of the economic system, and results of thisTable 6
Manufacturing exports changes w.r.t. BAU for EU27 (%).
Scenarios 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
GCTAX −0.47 −0.92 −2.00 −3.07 −3.57 −3.24 −4.17 −4.88
GET −0.25 −0.52 −1.59 −2.66 −2.42 −0.85 −0.32 0.30
EU-ETS −0.13 −0.39 −0.99 −1.92 −3.08 −4.20 −5.06 −5.54
BCAbat −0.13 −0.39 −1.00 −1.95 −3.16 −4.35 −5.29 −5.87
BCAnobat −0.13 −0.39 −0.97 −1.86 −3.00 −4.11 −4.99 −5.55
EERW −0.11 −0.38 −1.05 −1.96 −2.92 −3.81 −4.44 −4.79
Source: our elaboration on GDynE results.process sustaining the low-carbon transition may take some years to
be achieved.7
Energy-intensive sectors are most adversely affected by emissions re-
duction achievedby aunilateral EU-ETS policy. In Fig. 3we report changes
in export ﬂows in a pure ETS policy with respect to the baseline scenario
for manufacturing sectors for the periods 2030 and 2050. The basic metal
sector (which includes iron and steel industries) faces a negative change
in export ﬂows in relation to BAU that reaches 25% by 2050. Chemical in-
dustries also face a large reduction reaching a 10% loss by 2050. The less
energy-intensive sectors such as machinery and equipment will experi-
ence a small increase in exportﬂows in 2030 due to a relative higher com-
petitive advantage gained as a result of the increased production costs for
energy-intensive industries, but such a gain will turn into a loss by 2050.
The exports of the rest of theworld partially show amirror-image, es-
pecially for basic metals, chemicals and paper products. This reﬂects the
increase in relative competitiveness in the manufacture of carbon-
intensive products by the rest of the world. However, the exports of
non-metallic minerals (including cement and clinker) from the rest of
the world also decline in the long term (Fig. A1 in Appendix II). This re-
ﬂects the fact that the trade effects are not a zero-sum game, but that do-
mestic demand is also affected by the EU ETS policy, shrinking global
demand andnegatively affecting the export opportunities of all countries.
By complementing themitigation policywith trademeasures (Fig. 4),
some gains in export capacity are achieved for the two energy-intensive
sectors (basic metals and chemicals), but it is also worth noting that in
the case of a BCA based on a carbon content computed with a BAT ap-
proach the transport equipment and machinery and equipment sectors,
which include the best technologically performing ﬁrms in the EU, as
well as a large share of total manufacturing value added (Fig. A2 in
Appendix II), face a reduction in export ﬂows which exceed the losses
resulting from the pure ETS policy strategy. This means that protecting
fragile energy-intensive sectors could damage the technologically ad-
vanced sectors that constitute an engine of economic growth for Europe.
The export gains of the rest of the world that would be the result of
the EU ETS policy are largely undone by the BCAmeasures, especially in
the long run (Fig. A3 in Appendix II). The exports of non-metallic min-
erals even decrease with respect to BAU. If BCA rates were based on for-
eign carbon intensities (BCAnobat), exports of basic metals, chemicals,
pulp and paper and non-metallic minerals from the rest of the world
would fall by 3% to 7.5% (not shown).
Turning to the policy mix strategy including green technological ef-
forts, results are much more encouraging than for the trade protection
option (Fig. 5). The export ﬂow losses for fragile sectors such as basic
metals and chemicals are reduced reaching a maximum of −16.5%
(which is still a large loss) for basic metals and −8.4% for chemicals
which results in an improvement over the pure ETS-based mitigation
policy option which is quite similar to that obtained via a BCA measure.
Most importantly, it is alsoworthnoting that the technology-intensive
sectors here reported such as machinery and equipment and transport
equipment face a reduction by 2050 in export losses compared with the
EU-ETS case. This means that this policy mix strategy leads to a general-
ized improvement in the international competitiveness of EU industries,
without harming the sectors that constitute the core of industrial growth.
Therefore, by comparing Figs. 3–4–5 we note that the EERW policy
implies a general reduction in the sectoral export losses, with respect
to the ETS scenario but also to the BCAbat option, and it also ensures bet-
ter performances especially in term of export of technology-intensive
sectors. In this respect, we also need to recall that BCA measures act as
climate measures but explicitly affect the trade relationships among7 A similar pattern can be identiﬁed in terms of carbon leakage, where in the EERW sce-
nario results areworse in theﬁrst periods but become increasingly better in the later ones.
Moreover,when considering energy intensity,we also need to recall that even if the EERW
and the BCA optionsmay be characterized by the same intensity, the former implies lower
CO2 emissions due to the increasing role of renewable energy sources in electricity
production.
Fig. 3. Changes in export ﬂows in EU-ETS w.r.t. BAU for EU27 (%). Source: our elaboration on GDynE results.
Fig. 4. Changes in exports in BCAbat w.r.t. BAU for EU27 (%). Source: our elaboration on GDynE results.
254 A. Antimiani et al. / Ecological Economics 128 (2016) 246–259countries, in this case favouring EU export. On the other hand, the EERW
is primarily directed to affect the internal technological structure, and
its impact on international competitiveness depends on the magnitude
of the innovation efforts.8
For the rest of the world, the green technology strategy seems to be
the least disturbing protection strategy. While the effects on exports are
not as favourable as under the EUETSpolicywithout protectionmeasures,
the exports of basicmetals and chemicals slightly increasewith respect to
BAU and the decreases in exports of other industries (except for food that
increases its exports) are relatively small (Fig. A4 in Appendix II).
5. Optimality Assessment
To assess the alternative policy instruments used to mitigate the
adverse effects on competitiveness and carbon leakage, we apply the
‘optimality’ framework of Görlach (2013). This framework distinguishes
the following criteria:
• Environmental effectiveness: is the policy achieving its objectives?
• Cost effectiveness: is the policy achieving its objectives at least costs—
both in the short and long term?8 In this case, we model the impact of RD in green energy technologies without differ-
entiating across sectors, while in further development at least the distinction between
high-tech and low-tech sectors should be investigated.• Feasibility: what is the risk of policy failure— both for administrative,
legal and political reasons?
We propose a set of quantiﬁable indicators that can be directly
derived from the GDynE model. The indicators focus on environmental
effectiveness, static and dynamic efﬁciency, and political feasibility
(Table 7).
Environmental effectiveness of the anti-leakagemeasures ismeasured
by the change in carbon leakage in 2050 in %-points and the ultimate
environmental effect: the change in global CO2 emissions in 2050
(in Mt).
Cost effectiveness is measured in the short and long term. For the
short term, the indicator ‘CO2-price in 2030’ is used for the static efﬁcien-
cy of the policy. For the long term, we are interested in the dynamic
efﬁciency of the policy and use the indicators ‘CO2-price in 2050’ and
‘Energy-intensity in 2050’. We assume that a dynamically efﬁcient
policy would spur ‘green’ technological innovation thereby reducing
both the carbon price and the energy-intensity of production.
Political feasibility is divided into domestic political feasibility and in-
ternational political feasibility. The indicator for domestic political feasi-
bility is change in competitiveness of the EITE sector, measured by a
change in exports in the iron and steel sector (as the most affected
EITE sector). We have two indicators for international political feasibil-
ity. The ﬁrst is the effect of the anti-leakage policies on the burden
Fig. 5. Changes in exports in EERW w.r.t. BAU for EU27 (%). Source: our elaboration on GDynE results.
255A. Antimiani et al. / Ecological Economics 128 (2016) 246–259sharing of costs between the EU and the rest of the world. It is assumed
that a policy is less politically feasible the more it shifts the burden of
compliance (in terms of GDP) to the rest of the world. To highlight the
position of the poorest countries, we use the indicator ‘Rawls’ justice’
that measures the change in GDP of the poorest regions in our set of
regions (Ralws, 1971).
In terms of environmental effectiveness, all anti-leakage measures
show improvements to the basis EU ETS policy on both indicators. The
rate of leakage and global emissions decreases. In terms of environmen-
tal effectiveness, the gainswith the BCAbatmeasure are verymodest, the
rate of carbon leakage decreases from 49% to 48%. The largest gains are
made in the EERW policy option where the rate of leakage decreases by
19%-points and global emissions decrease by 1322 Mt (Table 8).
In terms of cost effectiveness, static efﬁciency in 2030, measured by
the CO2 price, is approximately equal between the basis EU ETS policy
and the two BCA options. Static efﬁciency is higher for the EERW policy
option. The impact on dynamic efﬁciency shows amixed pattern. On the
one hand, the CO2 price in 2050 is substantially lower for the EERWpol-
icy option, but, on the other, energy-intensity under EERW is (slightly)
higher. It should be assumed that EERW does not necessarily lead to a
decrease in energy intensity but does lead to a larger share of primary
energy being renewable.
In terms of political feasibility, all anti-leakagemeasures improve the
competitiveness of the EITE industry in comparison to the EU ETS policy
without suchmeasures. The BCAnobat policy offers the largest degree of
protection to the EITE sectors. The competitiveness of the whole
manufacturing sector is most improved by the EERW anti-leakage poli-
cy. The evidence for domestic political feasibility is therefore mixed:
representatives of the EITE sector may prefer BCAnobat protection,
whereas those representing the broader manufacturing industry may
prefer the EERWmeasure.
From an international perspective, the two BCA measures shift the
carbon compliance burden to the rest of the world. Here, the Rawls'Table 7
Criteria and indicators of optimality.
Criterion Indicator (1st level)
Environmental effectiveness
Cost-effectiveness Static efﬁciency
Dynamic efﬁciency
Political feasibility Competitiveness
Burden sharing ratio
Rawls' justicejustice criterion is based in terms of total GDP and the poorest region's
GDP is given by the sum of GDP values at 2050 in the BAU scenario for
all regions representing developing countries excluding emerging
economies and energy exporters. From an international perspective,
the EERW anti-leakage measure is likely to meet less resistance than
both BCA measures, especially the BCAnobat measure since the GDP
loss for this latter scenario is the highest w.r.t. BAU.
6. Conclusions
The European Union has developed a strategy to mitigate climate
change by cutting GHG emissions and fostering low carbon technolo-
gies. However, the risk of implementing unilateral policies is that
distortive effects are generated at the global scale that affect world
energy prices, international competitiveness and the geographical
allocation of carbon intensive production processes. Using an adjusted
dynamic CGE model, we assess the rate of carbon leakage and the
adverse impacts on competitiveness in a number of scenarios over the
period 2010–2050.
The results show two interesting aspects. First, if all countries
cooperate, there is obviously no carbon leakage and the economic ef-
fects for the EU are overall positive. There are adverse effects on the
competitiveness of EU manufacturing sector, but especially if interna-
tional emissions trading is allowed, these effects are very small and
decline towards the end of the planned horizon. Second, without
international cooperation, carbon leakage and the adverse effects on
competitiveness become quite serious. Anti-leakage measures can
mitigate leakage and adverse effects on competitiveness to some extent.
An ‘optimality’ analysis, based on environmental effectiveness, cost
effectiveness, and political feasibility criteria reveals that the extra
investment in energy efﬁciency and renewable scored relatively well
on all criteria in contrast with the BCA measures which scored not so
well, especially on the political feasibility criteria.Indicator (2nd level) Unit
Carbon leakage in 2050 (w.r.t. BAU) %
Global emissions in 2050 (w.r.t. BAU) Mt
CO2-price in 2030 USD/tCO2
CO2-price in 2050 USD/tCO2
Energy-intensity in 2050 toe/mln USD
ΔExport basic metals in 2050 (w.r.t. BAU) %
ΔExport manufactures in 2050 (w.r.t. BAU) %
ΔGDPEU/ΔGDPnon-EU in 2050 (w.r.t. BAU)
ΔGDPpoorest region in 2050 (w.r.t. BAU) mln USD
Table 8
Quantitative assessment of optimality.
Criterion Indicator Unit EU ETS BCAbat BCAnobat EERW
Environmental effectiveness Carbon leakage % 49 48 42 30
Global emissions Mt −973 −993 −1094 −1322
Cost effectiveness CO2-price 2030 USD/tCO2 140 140 142 127
CO2-price USD/tCO2 309 309 312 289
Energy intensity toe/MUSD 28 28 29 30
Political feasibility Exports basic metals % −24.3 −17.0 −10.3 −16.5
Export manufactures % −5.5 −5.9 −5.6 −4.8
Burden sharing −1.92 −1.92 −2.08 −1.77
Rawls' justice mln USD −3262 −2992 −4935 −2496
Source: our elaboration on GDynE results.
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on carbon leakage and competitiveness is obviously to have an
international agreement with broad cooperation. However, while
for EU countries the achievement of global binding abatement
targets would be more beneﬁcial than the unilateral solution, the
extended stagnation in international climate change negotiations
suggests that the existence of many groups of countries with differ-
ent and critical issues at stake has prevented the achievement of a
binding global agreement.
However, in the event of a lack of international cooperation, the
second-best policy option for the EU is to accelerate investments in
energy efﬁciency and renewable energy, protecting the competitiveness
of energy-intensive industries and enhancing the competitiveness of
technology-advanced industries. This allows turning the costs of
abatement policies into long term beneﬁts thanks to dynamic efﬁciency
obtained by stimulating investments in innovation activities ﬁnanced
through carbon tax revenues. These beneﬁts could be rather greater
in the case of a global climate solution, where dynamic efﬁciency
gains through green innovation in energy might ensure increased
competitiveness into international markets.
Findings discussed in this paper are obviously affected by several
limitations, mainly driven by the necessity to adopt speciﬁc assump-
tions in the modelling exercise, that could be addressed in future
research activities.
The ﬁrst issue refers to the adoption of differently designed
quantitative targets for selected regions, more coherent with the
ongoing bargaining positions in the climate negotiations. This will
help better acknowledging the causes behind the uncertainty in a
decisive and compulsory climate regime and thus will allow designing
new compensatory mechanisms enabling to escape the deadlock.
The second potential research line could be to investigate different
model settings for the representation of the technological pathways in
energy green energy technologies, including evolutionary trajectories
in R&D returns to scale and adoption and diffusion paths, that should
be carefully taken by empirical studies on this topic.
The third option could be given by the inclusion of an analytical
treatment of the impact of incentives on the demand side, thus also
representing the role of consumers and demand side policies on the
green energy sustainability transition.G
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Appendix I. Model speciﬁcation of the EERW scenarios
Given the CO2 abatement target and the associated level of carbon
tax CTAX, the total carbon tax revenue (CTR) from the amount of taxable
emissions (CO2) is given by:
CTR ¼ CTAX CO2 ð1Þ
The amount of CTR directed to RD activities is deﬁned as:
CTRD ¼ γ CTR ð2Þ
where γ represents the exogenous percentage rate deﬁned by policy
makers.
The total amount of CTRDﬁnances both energy efﬁciency and renew-
able energies technologies and also in this case the distribution of the
overall funds between the two technological domains is exogenously
given, as part of the policy options for the climate strategy. Accordingly:
RDEE ¼ δ CTRD ð3Þ
RDRW ¼ 1− δð ÞCTRD ð4Þ
where δ represents the share of RD directed towards input-augmenting
technical change in energy efﬁciency.
RD efforts are then transformed into technical change outcomes
according to a simple formulation:
tcEE ¼ rEE RDEE ð5Þ
tcRW ¼ rRW RDRW ð6Þ
where rEE and rRW are two reactivity parameters representing the elas-
ticities of technical change with respect to RD efforts in energy efﬁcien-
cy and renewables, respectively, calculated on the basis of historical
statistics.
Appendix II. Additional tables and ﬁgures from simulations
Table A1
Manufacturing value added changes w.r.t. BAU for EU27 (%).Scenarios 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050CTAX 0.03 0.34 0.62 1.24 1.88 2.78 3.17 4.07
ET 0.03 0.35 0.69 1.43 2.00 2.28 2.26 2.77
U-ETS 0.02 −0.14 −0.30 −0.85 −1.62 −2.16 −2.49 −2.70
CAbat 0.03 −0.13 −0.28 −0.76 −1.44 −1.90 −2.15 −2.28
CAnobat 0.03 −0.11 −0.21 −0.54 −0.96 −1.13 −1.04 −0.87
ERW 0.01 −0.13 −0.25 −0.61 −1.08 −1.38 −1.54 −1.64ESource: our elaboration on GDynE results.
Fig. A1. Changes in exports in EU-ETS w.r.t. BAU for the rest of the world (non-EU27) (%). Source: our elaboration on GDynE results.
Fig. A2.Manufacturing value added composition in BAU for EU27 (%). Source: our elaboration on GDynE results.
Fig. A3. Changes in exports in BCAbat w.r.t. BAU for the rest of the world (non-EU27) (%). Source: our elaboration on GDynE results.
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Fig. A4. Changes in exports in EERW w.r.t. BAU for the rest of the world (non-EU27) (%). Source: our elaboration on GDynE results.
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